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I thank you, the members of the Georgia Society of International
and Comparative Law, for the honor of your invitation to speak at
your annual banquet. I would also like to thank my old friend and
fellow student, Professor Gabriel Wilner and, of course, Dean El-
lington and Professors Schoenbaum and Huszagh for gracing the
evening with their presence. I know that quite a few of you were
probably worried (and I include my son in that category) about my
reliability as a guest. Would I make it here on time? Well, I did
miss my flight from London to Atlanta yesterday, and as a result
had to come through New York. This, however, was an attempt on
my part to ensure that I actually got here. I don't know whether
you are aware of what the British wit G.K. Chesterton, a great idol
of mine, said about such behavior. He said that "the only way to
make sure of catching a train is to miss the one before it," and that
is just what I did.
It actually has been twenty years since I last spoke to the Georgia
Society of International and Comparative Law. I accepted Gabe
Wilner's suggestion, and Dean Rusk's kind invitation, to speak to
what was then a newborn Georgia Society, and I am absolutely
fascinated to see how the Society has since flourished. I think it was
some ten years before that, that Gabe Wilner and I (in collaboration
with others) were organizing the Columbia Society of International
and Comparative Law, and indeed witnessing the emergence of coun-
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terpart organizations at Harvard, Yale, and later Virginia.
It was with particular pleasure, therefore, that I learned, when I
accepted a second invitation to come and speak here, that you had
won the Phillip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition.
This represents a superb performance. As I think Gabe Wilner has
said, he and I were involved at the outset of this competition, and
indeed we were proud to be members of the Columbia team that
competed in the competition's first championship.
I think your chairman has been overly generous in saying that we
won the first championship. In fact, at that time there were only
three teams competing: Harvard, Yale, and Columbia. We had an
extremely tactful group of judges who gave an award to each of the
teams. I forget which team won the award for best oral presentation.
However, the judges made sure another team got the best written
presentation, and then to make sure the third team didn't feel left
out, they gave them the award for best overall performance. So we
all came away with a prize! The Georgia team gets extra plaudits
for winning what is now a much more demanding competition, indeed
a world-wide contest. I hope that you will accept heartiest congrat-
ulations on winning the championship.
When I reflected on what would be an appropriate topic for this
evening, I came to the conclusion that my remarks, in some way,
should pay homage to a generation of United States international
lawyers who, when serving under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman,
set the framework for world organization as we know it today; even
if today that framework is in disarray. A brilliant recent book which
I recommend to all of you, The Wise Men,' assesses the impact of
certain key men on the New Deal period and demonstrates the ded-
ication and idealism that they brought to bear during their tenures
in office. I refer to people like Chip Boland, George Kennan, Abe
Lovett, Avrell Harriman, John J. McCloy, and Dean Acheson. If I
have any criticism of this book, it is that the author does not do
justice to that particular contemporary gentleman of international
law and diplomacy, Phillip Jessup.
Western nations all owe that group of statesmen a deep debt of
gratitude for their role in putting in place the multilateral framework
of organizations that set the basis for the West's uninterrupted ec-
onomic progress until the 1970's. The United States during that
W. IsAAcsoN, THE WISE MEN (1986).
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period, working in tandem with the United Kingdom, gave the political
leadership, and through these organizations international lawyer-dip-
lomats negotiated the institutional framework for economic recovery.
During my ten years with the World Bank's Legal Department,
one of my most challenging assignments was to defend the World
Bank against efforts by the Soviet bloc countries, and a number of
impressionable African governments working with them, to attempt
through resolutions of the UN General Assembly to impose political
controls over the lending policies of the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). This defense required detailed re-
search into the travaux prtparatoires of the Bretton Woods Agreements
and the later Dumbarton Oaks preparations for the UN Charter
Conference in San Francisco.
I still am fascinated by two discoveries in the course of my research.
The first was the farsightedness and the wisdom of the draftsmen of
the IMF and the World Bank articles of agreement. The draftsmen
were true international financial lawyers with a heavy emphasis on
their internationalism. This is characterized by the willingness, par-
ticularly on the part of the dominant United States team, to avoid
pressing home the paramount economic power of the United States
by ensuring, for example, a formal United States veto over lending
policies. It is thus somewhat distressing to note that over the last
decade the United States has reversed that farsighted and liberal
course of action. We have seen during the last few years several
attempts by the United States to interfere with or to seek a veto
power over the lending policies of international agencies such as the
Inter-American Development Bank. There have been other examples
of efforts to impose political control over the lending policies of
institutions which for many years had protected their lending policy
from any kind of political interference by strong economic powers.
The second discovery concerned the initially dominant, but ever
constructive, internationalist role of the United States lawyers in the
period after 1945. This was noticed immediately by the international
father of the Bretton Woods Agreements. I refer to Maynard Keynes,
Professor Keynes, or Lord Keynes, depending on what period you
take him, the economist and the leader of the British delegation. He
recalled the constructive role the United States lawyers had played
in the process of negotiation when speaking at the banquet that
marked the successful conclusion of the Bretton Woods Conference
in New Hampshire. At the outset of the Bretton Woods discussions
he had paid a call on Henry Morgentheau, who was then United
States Secretary of the Treasury. Upon his arrival he was shown into
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the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, where Morgentheau was
sitting surrounded by a number of his advisors. The Secretary's first
question to Keynes was, "Where are your lawyers?" To this Keynes
replied that he really did not need lawyers and normally did not
bring them to such meetings. Keynes was flabbergasted by Morgen-
theau's response which was, "Well, in that case who does your
thinking for you?" Keynes writes in his diary that he went away
believing that when the Mayflower crossed the Atlantic, the passenger
list must have been composed entirely of lawyers. Keynes, of course,
came from the British civil service tradition of mandarins with ab-
horrence for interference by lawyers. But even he admitted at the
banquet that the lawyers had done an essential job with panache.
He said they, "had drafted the agreements with an element of poetry."
Recently, another Professor, Richard Gardner at Columbia who
taught both Gabriel Wilner and myself, delivered a paper at the
Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park in New York City entitled "Has
Liberal Internationalism a Future?". He cited a number of key chal-
lenges facing liberal internationalism; liberal internationalism being
defined as the intellectual and political tradition that believes in the
construction of a peaceful world order requiring multilateral coop-
eration and the leadership of the strong liberal democracies. Professor
Gardner identified several issues as challenges, many of which I think
most of us here tonight would agree upon.
First, there is the disintegration of the Soviet Empire. This brings
with it the danger of nationalism and ethnic unrest and a new crisis
of self-determination. In addition, there is the problem of developing
human rights standards to address these issues in order to avoid the
dangers associated with unstable borders. These sorts of dangers will
require very constructive international lawyer work to ensure some
form of collective security and some form of rules and supervision
to guarantee that we do not again go down the route followed in
the 1920's.
Today it is the U.S.S.R., instead of Germany, which is searching
for a means of common interest and for common action. This is a
period in which international law will have a major role to play. The
U.S.S.R. has been a country that has practiced economic autarchy.
It is interesting that, at the time when it looks likely that the Soviet
Union may be persuaded to join the International Monetary Fund
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), we see
the United States and the European Community and Japan moving
ever more threateningly down the road to bilateralism in trade rather
than the multilateral approach embodied in the GATT. Indeed, there
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is a danger facing the world now of a slide to economic autarchy
with three major trading blocs developing as a result of the inability
of Western nations to work out their problems through consultation.
I refer, of course, to moves to establish a United States-Canada-
Mexico axis and for the Japanese and the newly industrialized coun-
tries of ASEAN to move from reliance on the United States market
towards the creation of an Asian trading area for themselves. One
should also cite of course, the problems associated with the way that
the European Community is perceived to be proceeding down the
route to 1992. Is a slide to economic autarchy inevitable? Will United
States mechanisms such as section 301 and bilateral negotiations make
it difficult for multilateral systems like the GATT to survive? Here
is a challenge for international lawyers during the next decade.
A second area where there is a major challenge is that of North-
South relations. Here we face a particular problem with the debt
crisis, which as yet remains unresolved. I would like to spend a little
time discussing that with you now.
Aid to developing countries was, of course, the United States' idea,
fostered by the very same wise men to whom I referred at the outset.
The admitted objective was to stop the advancement of communism;
an advance which was stopped and now is decreasing. Yet we have
at this time a serious problem with continually falling standards of
living in the poorest countries. Moreover, it is shocking to consider
that developing countries currently are making net transfers of ap-
proximately $50 billion dollars per year to the wealthiest countries
that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). This is an extraordinary development during
a period in which the developing countries, because of environmental
problems, the drug problem, the danger of nuclear proliferation, and
the dangers of missile technology, are in a position, if they get fed
up and loose faith in the international system, to create problems
far beyond the scale of the problems suffered by the world in the
1920's due to the economic and ethnic problems of central Europe.
The thesis of the new challenge to the old liberal internationalist
policies is that the developing countries, while no longer liable to
become communist, can slide rapidly away from democracy and begin
to effect us in ways with which we will find it difficult to cope during
the next decade. Developing countries, such as Brazil, Guyana, or
Ecuador can burn down their forests to everybody's detriment, or
produce and sell drugs, or manufacture chemical weapons. They are
also the source of many of the commodities that, despite our growing
service economies, we continue to need. We need a North-South
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dialogue to establish a workable basis for the recognition of the real
interdependence of nations. Liberal internationalism, as Professor
Gardner defines it, is in fact the only policy which can cope with
the challenges that the United States and the Western world will face
in the twenty-first century.
Let us just look in a little more detail at the international debt
crisis. In it, I think, will be an element of the answer to the question,
"Has liberal internationalism a future?" because debt is also very
fundamental to our ability to solve the other problems to which I
have referred.
I suppose the answer to the question is that liberal internationalism
has been in retreat as the United States and all the OECD countries
have wrestled with the economic crises following the shock of Vietnam
and the guns and butter policy of Lyndon Johnson. As they reeled
from the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 and as they struggled to
maintain growth and to meet the military challenge of the Soviets
around the globe in the 1970's and the early 1980's, the development
effort began to loose momentum. Above all, liberal internationalism
has been in retreat as these countries have struggled and failed to
coordinate their economies and their economic policies in the fight
to control inflation and to remedy the massive balance of payments
problems that have produced wildly gyrating exchange rates. These
latter problems are especially acute for the developing countries that
have massive external debts.
What we have been seeing are the results of failures to adapt
existing structures, or to adopt new structures and systems, to deal
with international finance and trade affairs. This reflects a failure
of leadership in the Western world. Since 1970 and President Nixon's
decision to abandon the convertability of the United States dollar
into gold, and the resultant demise of the fixed exchange rate, the
system set for the IMF by the Bretton Woods Agreements has, in
effect, been inoperative. We have come up with nothing to replace
it. We have also, I have to admit, seen a period in which much of
Western policy has been driven by banks and bankers and by bilat-
eralism or mercantilism on the parts of Western governments pursuing
their own short-term narrow national interests and economic affairs.
The signs of this continuing malaise were all there to see in the
early 1970's. The World Bank, where I was working, abandoned its
role as a prudent investment banker to the world. The United States
perceived foreign aid as a weapon to fight communism, which it was
in the 1940's and 1950's, but the United States and other Western
governments made less and less effort during this period to meet the
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aid targets and to control profligate spending by LDC governments.
At this same time the World Bank, under Robert MacNamara, took
on the role, unfortunately some would say, of an aid agency less
and less willing to impose strict controls on the use of its money and
to monitor its projects. The role of the lawyer in the Agency for
International Development (AID) and at the multilateral banks be-
came less and less important. Lawyers were seen as negative elements
holding back rapid disbursement of loans. This was so much the case
that in the late 1960's and the early 1970's those of us working in
places like the World Bank would joke that what Robert MacNamara
really needed was a polaroid photo of a loan signing ceremony.
Written on the back of the photograph would be, "The World Bank
promises to loan the Government of X $Y million dollars and the
Ministry of Finance of X promises to repay the World Bank $Y
million dollars in twenty equal semi-annual installments commencing
on blank and ending on blank and to pay annual interest on the
amount outstanding of the rate of Z%", with the signatures of the
President of the Bank and the Ministry appended at the bottom of
the backside of the photograph. That is the point at which we had
arrived by 1973.
It was at this point that I decided to leave my attorney position
at the World Bank and to take up a career as an international banker.
If you can't lick them, join them! Originally my business was making
commercial bank loans to the LDC's, actually organizing business
for them. Then I began advising governments and project sponsors
on borrowing strategy-how to borrow as efficiently and as cheaply
as possible. Then in due course, I took on project finance, organizing
limited recourse finance or off-balance sheet finance. But by the mid-
1970's the IMF and the World Bank had lost control over developing
countries' borrowings, and they had lost this control to the commercial
banks. Walter Wriston of Citibank was able to declare, "Countries
do not go bankrupt." The world's major banks and hundreds of
new banking intermediaries, established to meet this kind of demand,
rushed to face the challenge of taking on deposits from the oil rich
Arabs and lending to the developing countries. They called this ac-
tivity, "taking on assets".
Whenever the IMF and the World Bank urged caution, the United
States banks urged Congress to force the World Bank to retreat and
to leave such lending to the commercial banks which were more than
competent to run these affairs themselves. The United States, and
indeed, the G-5 and the G-7 nations, were only too happy to encourage
this stampede to lend. A number of warning voices urged the OECD
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countries to regulate the Euro-markets and this helter-skelter lending.
Nothing was done. Lawyers in London and New York adapted stan-
dard loan documentation to facilitate this lending process. Many were
the conferences held to spread this gospel and this knowledge. In
1976, I confess, I chaired one such conference attended by some 700
bankers and lawyers-they had to be turned away. I invited an old
Columbia friend, Lawrence Collins, a partner at Herbert Smith and
Co. of London, a leading firm of solicitors, to present a paper on
the treatment of default. He rose to speak and asked that the lights
be turned down so that he could show his one and only slide for
the afternoon. What we all saw was a blank screen. This, he said,
demonstrated the mind of the average financial lawyer when he was
informed that his client's loan had gone into default.
What then has happened since the full onset of the debt crisis in
1982? All I can tell you is that unlike the situation of a company
going bankrupt, the debt of the developing countries continues to
grow, with interest on interest and the build-up of arrears. We had
the Baker Plan, announced by then Secretary of the Treasury James
Baker. This was designed to encourage new banking flows to de-
veloping countries that rescheduled their loans. It was hoped that
new lending would enable them to borrow enough money to grow,
to pay their interest and keep the loans current, and therefore prevent
the banks from getting into trouble with their regulators and share-
holders, to say nothing of becoming bankrupt. But the banks did
not lend, because the OECD governments had not changed or adapted
their rules on taxation, and the regulators did not harmonize their
regulations. So to get a group of syndicated banks to agree on a
common position, and to work through the Baker Plan, became
manifestly impossible; or so difficult that once you had done it for
Mexico, everybody went for a long holiday to recover before they
tackled Brazil. And so it went on and on. Rescheduling simply made
matters worse.
So, we followed the Baker Plan with the Brady Plan. This was a
plan we all welcomed because it faced reality-the Emperor has no
clothes. It said, finally, the LDC's should not be pushed into ex-
pensive, unmanageable rescheduling and taking on new debt. Rather,
creditor nations should encourage debt reduction by getting the banks
to allow governments to buy back their debt by borrowing money
from the IMF and the World Bank and using that money or their
reserves to purchase the debt in the secondary markets where the
value was quite clearly far less than one hundred cents on the dollar.
I may say, for example, in the case of Argentina right now it is
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probably only worth eleven cents on the dollar. So, .a country borrows
money from the World Bank or the IMF, and this is pretty expensive
money, and it uses this new money to buy back the debt that it owes
the former creditors that are not advancing the debtor country any
more money. There is only one defect in this exercise: the debt owed
to the international agencies is never reschedulable. So, we are re-
placing reschedulable debt with unreschedulable debt. This phenom-
enon will make life especially difficult for the debtor countries if the
scheme does not really work out the way it is intended. So, that
ladies and gentlemen is the Brady Plan.
Meanwhile, the developing countries are told, and quite rightly so,
that they must adjust their economies. They are told they must go
in for structural adjustment. They are told they must open up their
economies to the goods and services of Western countries and com-
panies. They are told they must facilitate foreign direct investment
by international companies into their economy, and that they must
welcome back the multinational corporations. Developing countries
now have learned their lesson of the folly of past practices such as
nationalization and deterrents to foreign investors. They are now
generally anxious to welcome foreign investors. But which prudent
foreign investor is going to invest in a country with a continuing
massive debt overhang, and in effect a long term mortgage over its
foreign exchange income over the next twenty or thirty years? There
is no light at the end of the tunnel in such cases. It is in fact getting
worse.
More recently you have been hearing about debt-equity conversions.
That is to say, you sell the family silver by converting the debt which
you really cannot really repay into real assets, and you do it on a
basis of buying back the debt for so many cents on a dollar. Again,
this is not a very palatable type of exercise. The countries that open
up their markets and economies and look for foreign investment and
adapt their tax rules- to make investment look attractive, despite the
debt overhang, are now going to find it difficult to compete with
Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe has begun to look like an attractive
place for companies to invest and produce right next door to the
world's biggest market, Western Europe. Third World investments
and assets will look less attractive.
We face a situation in which the debt crisis continues, and no
framework has been put in place to resolve it. Ad hoc solutions or
band-aids are being put over the sore; they temporarily cover the
problem while people scurry around and look for what they can
come up with for a solution. The responsibilities of the various parties
1990]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
for the crisis are not properly examined. The negligence of the banks
in making loans, and of the governments of Western countries in
encouraging them to make loans, are not taken into account. The
real costs falls on developing countries who, by and large, have taken
on the burden and admitted their responsibility for an element of
the blame.
The other interesting or disturbing feature about the current sit-
uation is that with the succession of systems under which we have
been operating, the Baker Plan and the Brady Plan, not all of the
creditors are treated equally. It is very interesting that the international
lending agencies do not reschedule their loans, nor do bond holders.
Those categories of creditors always are paid on time. The people
who get rescheduled are the commercial banks. You can say, "Well,
a lot of them deserve it." But what about the forgotten, the unwanted
guests at the debt rescheduling table, the trade creditors, the people
who actually continue to provide money, the people who import raw
materials, spare parts, and essential goods to keep the economy in
the developing countries working so that they can, in effect, work
their way out of their problem? They have been systematically dis-
regarded and treated unfairly in all of these exercises. There has been
no genuine settlement, no workout; just temporary half measures
continuing to focus on short-term national interests and dealing only
with government to government and commercial bank debt.
I have gone into this in some detail because I feel that this is one
example of the challenges to which Professor Dick Gardner referred.
We need liberal internationalism to be brought into play here. We
need people like yourselves to be looking for solutions, to be trying
to find analogies in domestic law and general principles of bankruptcy
law, in general principles of workout practice, and to apply those to
the international arena. Unless we can solve this problem, most of
the other problems will grow and become impossible to control by
multilateral or international cooperation. We need tailor-made wor-
kouts. We need some sort of forum with the power to decide what
is a fair deal for a debtor and to establish rules of fair play as
between creditors. We need some method of rewriting loan contracts
to adapt them to evolving situations totally outside of the control of
the parties. Examples would be monetarist measures or bad economic
management in the West, which result in higher interest rates which
are then passed on as an extra burden to developing countries which
have no control over interest rate policy in Western countries.
I am very interested to see, for example, the way that the Indo-
nesians and the Sudanese, to whom I had the pleasure of acting as
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an adviser, use a type of international ombudsman as an independent
person to look at the country's resources, to find out what the country
could pay fairly and could manage to pay while continuing to run
their economy and help themselves grow out of trouble. The om-
budsman has the role of looking at the foreign exchange resources
available and endorsing, if you like, a workout plan. That kind of
idea may be one that can be adapted to the developing countries
situation in lieu of a forum. But is it possible to use the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, or a special tribunal
at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague as a forum
which could look at each individual debtor country's situation and
work out a rational formula for repayment that the country can
actually sustain and discharge?
It is very interesting that in the 1920's and the 1930's the German
Government faced a lack of credit when the French, the British, and
the Americans insisted on unrealistic reparations. These latter gov-
ernments wanted to squeeze as much money out of the Germans as
they could without providing the Germans with access to foreign
currency in amounts adequate to make their economy work. What
did we get as a result of that behavior: Hitler and the Second World
War.
It is very interesting that in 1953, the Germans were able to ne-
gotiate, possibly on the basis of everyone's experience with the 1930's,
the 1953 London Agreement which, in effect, reduced Germany's
external debt by seventy percent. Now, you look at what is being
asked of Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, or Mexico and you will find
that we are not making any effort to reduce their external debt; not
even by fifty percent or thirty percent. No such effort is being made
for developing countries at the moment.
That, I am afraid, is a fairly long list of problems that we face.
I think that liberal internationalism can deal with these challenges
and that the time is right, as Gabe Wilner said in his introductory
remarks, for idealistic, perservering lawyers to bring some degree of
leadership to issues such as the Third World debt problem. I hope
it is not too late. One recent commentator at the Oxford International
Institute, to which I belong, David Knox, formerly vice-president of
the World Bank in charge of Latin America, has just published a
book2 which came out last week. In it, he says basically, "the party
2 D. KNox, LATIN AmmucA DEBT (1990).
1990]
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
is over." As someone who has worked with Latin America over the
last twenty years, he concludes that debtors must now proceed to a
concerted default on all their debt because it is unmanageable. I hope
he is wrong, because I think that would be a very bad precedent. It
must be possible to work out some system of gradual repayment and
debt reduction that would make the problem manageable.
Jos6 Ortega y Gasset has said, "Nations are formed and kept alive
by the fact that they have a program for tomorrow." Liberal inter-
nationalism, I think, is just such a program. It is desperately needed
now. We desperately need international financial lawyer-diplomats of
the type personified by Phillip Jessup.
I think it is appropriate to conclude, in talking to a group of
idealistic, young, international lawyers who are about to start their
careers, with the remarks of Albert Camus talking about the role of
youth. He said, "Inertia is man's greatest temptation, it is not enough
to do one's job. Youth must be active in the world, for the world
can be saved by this generation or it will not be saved. The world
must accept the solidarity of misfortune." Thank you very much
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